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ABSTRACT 
 
Immigrants at Home explores the history of Chinese citizens who immigrated to Mexico 
primarily during the last half of the 19th century and the first part of the 20th.  Examining this 
subject from a social perspective, the paper first seeks to elaborate upon the process of 
negotiation that took place between these immigrants and dominant Mexican society.  Chinese 
immigrants initially succeeded in modifying the roles prescribed for them by Mexican political 
thought, and the cultural agency that they displayed in both their sexual and economic practices 
made life in Mexico tolerable and even prosperous.1  However, following the onslaught of the 
Mexican Revolution in 1910 and its concordant ideologies of nationalism, xenophobia, and 
racism, social discourse demanded that the Chinese immigrants abandon many of their survival 
strategies.  Faced with violence and discrimination, many of these immigrants undertook a final 
renegotiation of their roles in Mexico by leaving the country with their Mexican wives and 
families.  The paper attempts to synchronize these events into a broad examination of the factors 
and circumstances that allow particular adaptation and negotiation strategies to both succeed and 
change at divergent historical moments. 
Methodology 
The work draws on a wealth of historical research and resources.  The most significant of 
these sources are correspondences of U.S. Consular Agents in Mexico, which are available in the 
National Archives Records Group 59.  However, the work of other scholars also proved crucial 
to the completion of this research.  For instance, studies by Evelyn Hu-Dehart that analyzed the 
                                                 
1 In her introduction to Cultural Agency in the Americas, Doris Summer defines cultural agency as “social 
contributions through creative practices.”  See: Sommer, Doris, “Introduction: Wiggle Room,” in Cultural Agency in 
the Americas, ed. Doris Sommer, 1-28 (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 1.   
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economic and social maturation of the Chinese community offered important background on 
these components of the immigrants’ experience.  Robert H. Duncan also writes about Chinese 
economics in Mexico.  Julia Maria Schiavone Camacho’s work presents a fascinating analysis of 
Chinese-Mexican gender relations, while Philip A. Dennis and Jorge Gomez Izquierdo cover 
race and anti-Chinese sentiment, respectively.  Finally, the studies of Leo M. Jacques and 
Charles C. Cumberland focus on the Chinese experience in Sonora, while Roberto Chao Romero 
links the Chinese experience in Mexico to the larger phenomenon of Chinese diaspora.2  While 
these authors undoubtedly helped in the formulation of the work’s theory, many of these writings 
depict Chinese immigrants solely as victims of state power.  This paper, then, adds to the field of 
history an alternate analysis of Chinese immigrants in Mexico as agents who continually 
negotiated with Mexican discourse not only through their adaptation strategies that allowed them 
to prosper in Mexico but also through their various responses (including emigration away from 
their new country) to Mexican hostility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Robert Chao Romero, “The Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement in Mexico: 1882-1940,” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2003), xvi-xvii. 
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Introduction: Trouble in Sonora 
In September of 1925, a report from U.S. Consular Agent Henry C. A. Damm working in 
Sonora, Mexico relayed the destructive action of rioters in the eastern Sonora town of Nacozari 
de Pilares.  There, a reported mob of 1,000 Mexicans under the leadership of anti-Chinese 
activists attacked the stores and homes of Chinese residents of this community, even holding 
some as hostages.  Mexican police proved ineffective in ameliorating the situation; one officer 
was fatally shot and another wounded before federal cavalry troops ended the crisis.  However, 
this military maneuver did not seem to quell the anti-Chinese sentiments in the town.  Damm 
reported that a bridge on a local rail line later burned down, presumably the work of the rioters in 
trying to prevent more federal military action.  He also signaled the continued likelihood of anti-
Chinese attacks in Sonora by claiming that, “with the feeling against the Chinese existing in 
Sonora, similar outbreaks and disturbances may be expected to occur at any time.”3
The incident in Nacozari de Pilares is indicative of a wider development of anti-Chinese 
sentiment throughout Mexico following the onset and culmination of the Mexican Revolution of 
1910.  Chinese immigrants, mostly men, flocked to Mexico in increasing numbers in response to 
favorable economic and political conditions propagated by Porfirio Diaz’ administration (1876-
1910) that called for more workers to fuel economic projects such as railroad building and 
mining.  By adopting a variety of strategies and community building techniques, many of these 
immigrants successfully renegotiated their prescribed roles as wage laborers, and many even 
became wealthy.  Their strategies included: shunning low paying jobs and Mexican business 
                                                 
3 Report from Henry C. A. Damm entitled, “Anti-Chinese Demonstrations in Sonora, Mexico,” (Sept. 5, 1925), 
National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016/14, The Ohio State University Libraries.  
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models for more lucrative, mercantile pursuits, forming mutual aid societies that allowed for 
increased Chinese community communication, and forming family ties with Mexican women. 
Following the development of nationalistic and xenophobic political ideologies in 
Mexico after the Mexican Revolution, the prosperity that these strategies afforded to Chinese 
immigrants to Mexico became threatened by anti-Chinese feelings.4  Mexicans subjected 
Chinese immigrants to abuses that targeted physical and economic well being as well as their 
legal rights, and many of these abuses focused on the very strategies that had made the Chinese 
in Mexico successful in the first place.  For instance, economic hostility often took the form of 
riots or processions in front of successful Chinese business, while labor unions and anti-Chinese 
groups directed non-violent hostility against Chinese merchants by encouraging boycotts or 
outright closures of Chinese stores.  Similarly, legal sanctions often proposed by elected officials 
targeted both Chinese economic success and Chinese practices of forming relationships with 
Mexican women.   
As this growing anti-Chinese sentiment increased, Chinese immigrants largely refused to 
propitiate this violent discourse by abandoning the very practices that made them successful.  
Instead, the immigrants continued to rely on practices that allowed them to prosper in Mexico, 
and as their poor treatment became unbearable, they engaged in a final form of negotiation with 
Mexican society by leaving the country with their wives and families, a behavior that produced 
negative consequences for Mexican economics and social relations.      
This study seeks to examine how Chinese immigrant groups that were so successful in 
negotiating for a prosperous life in Mexico ultimately renegotiated this success as a result of the 
                                                 
4 For the development of nationalism and xenophobic ideologies in Mexico, see:  Leo M. Jacques. “Have Quick 
More Money than Mandarins: The Chinese in Sonora,” The Journal of Arizona History 17, no. 2 (1976), 202-7. 
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rise of xenophobic and nationalistic ideologies following the Mexican Revolution.  While 
strategies such as operating small businesses, forming mutual aid societies, and marrying 
Mexican women had proved effective in helping them to adjust to their new homes, Chinese 
immigrants largely continued to rely on similar practices in dealing with growing Mexican 
persecution as the twentieth century unfolded.  However, nationalist sentiment in Mexico that 
arose from revolution would no longer tolerate these strategies, and the Chinese immigrant 
community consequently found itself embroiled in a conflict of ideologies that would ultimately 
lead it to undertake a final, drastic form of cultural negotiation by leaving Mexico altogether. 
 
The Acceptance of Foreign Influence in Mexico: 1876-1910 
From the initial stages of Porfirio Diaz’s regime (1876-1910) until the beginning stages 
of the Mexican Revolution, nationalist political discourse in Mexico largely encouraged not only 
foreign immigration to Mexico, but also foreign economic development. Kenneth R. Cott 
describes a “consensus on development” amongst Mexican political leaders in the last half of the 
19th century.  He claims that this consensus revolved around a theory that Mexico had the 
potential for wealth, and that immigration, a transportation system, a removal of government 
obstacles, and an establishment of order could help this nation to realize such potential.  Cott 
cites a desired increase in the labor force as another reason why political thought encouraged 
immigration at this time.5  Evelyn Hu-Dehart and others echo the idea that prevalent thought in 
Mexico following Diaz’ rise to prominence in 1876 shifted to ideas of capitalism, and both 
Robert H. Duncan and Gómez Izquierdo claim that Diaz’ scheme for modernizing Mexico 
                                                 
5 Kenneth Cott, “Mexican Diplomacy and the Chinese Issue, 1876-1910,” Hispanic American Historical Review 67, 
no.1 (Feb., 1987): 63-4. 
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through market expansion and colonization of remote areas initially focused on attracting white, 
Catholic European settlers.6   
However, when the prospect of immigration to Mexico, especially to “barren” frontier 
regions in need of colonization and settlement, failed to lure European colonists, Mexican 
authorities accepted Chinese immigrants as the best available alternative.7  Mexican diplomat to 
the United States and finance minister Matías Romero was among the first prominent figures to 
endorse the prospect of Chinese immigration, and this leader’s comments, as well as the ideas of 
other government officials, illustrate that this policy was designed to infuse Mexico with a new 
supply of labor.8  The 1899 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between China and Mexico, a treaty 
that made immigration of Chinese citizens to Mexico “free and voluntary,” perfectly manifested 
this political acceptance of an influx of Chinese citizens. 9  Partially as a result of this treaty, 
Chinese immigrants in Mexico, already present in the decades leading up to 1900, increased 
from 2,718 in 1900 to around 13,202 in 1910.10 In spite of the country’s turbulent political 
conditions, the immigration of Chinese to the Mexican state of Sonora remained surprisingly 
“heavy” during the period of revolutionary conflict following the capitulation of Diaz in 1910, 
                                                 
6 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “Voluntary Associations in a Predominantly Male Immigrant Community: The Chinese on the 
Northern Mexican Frontier, 1880-1930,” in Voluntary Associations in the Chinese Diaspora, ed. Khun Eng Kuah-
Pearce and Evelyn Hu-Dehart, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006): 141; Robert. H. Duncan.  “The 
Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California, 1889-1929,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 74, no. 4 (Nov., 1994), 616; José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino en México 
(1871-1934) (México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1991): 43. 
7 Robert. H. Duncan.  “The Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California, 1889-1929,” The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 4 (Nov., 1994), 616-7. 
8 Kenneth Cott, “Mexican Diplomacy and the Chinese Issue, 1876-1910,” Hispanic American Historical Review 67, 
no.1 (Feb., 1987), 64-7. 
9 Ibid., 69. 
10 Ibid, 63, 69-70; Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (Laborers) and 
Huashang (Merchants) in Latin America/Caribbean,” in Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, ed. 
Wanni W. Anderson and Robert G. Lee, (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 90 (see 
table 5.2). 
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and the total Chinese population in all of Mexico in 1926 was 24,218.11  Most of these 
immigrants settled in the states of Baja California, Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Tamaulipas, 
Chiapas, Veracruz, and Yucatan.12  As these facts demonstrate, Porfirian economic policy had 
succeeded in encouraging foreign immigration to Mexico, and many of these immigrants were 
from China. 
Mexican political and economic conditions were not the only factors that encouraged 
Chinese citizens to move to Mexico.  In his dissertation on Chinese immigration entitled, “The 
Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement in Mexico, 1882-1940,” Robert 
Chao Romero provides a detailed look at Chinese political, social, and economic forces that also 
led Chinese citizens to leave their native land.  Most Chinese citizens came from the southern 
Chinese province of Guangdong.  As they had in all of China, population numbers in this 
province from 1787 to 1850 grew rapidly, increasing from 16 million to 28 million (during the 
same period, overall Chinese population grew from 143 million to 432 million).  Romero is 
quick to point out why this could be a problem for Chinese citizens: 
Despite such marked demographic growth, this boom of new births was not accompanied by any increase 
in agricultural productivity or natural resources, and the Ch’ing government initiated no new agrarian or 
land reform policies designed to counter the negative impact of Chinese population pressures. 
This author later names “land shortages,” “reduced standards of living,” “increased 
indebtedness,” and “peasant socio-economic displacement,” as the manifestations of these 
                                                 
11 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (Laborers) and Huashang 
(Merchants) in Latin America/Caribbean,” in Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, ed. Wanni W. 
Anderson and Robert G. Lee, (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 90; For 
population statistics, see: Robert Chao Romero, “The Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement 
in Mexico: 1882-1940,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2003), 265-6 . 
12 Charles C. Cumberland, “The Sonora Chinese and the Mexican Revolution,” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 40, no. 2 (May, 1960), 191. 
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“population pressures.”13  Population increases and land problems were not the only factors that 
led Chinese citizens to leave their homelands.  Shifts to commercial agriculture forced 
traditional, subsistence farmers to sell their lands and seek wage labor.  Other Chinese citizens 
lost their traditional jobs as more trading ports opened following the British victory in the Opium 
War of 1839-1842.  Chinese textiles struggled to compete with cheap, imported European 
varieties, and new commercial ports (opened as part of the war’s treaty) drove workers in other 
ports out of business.14  Even political conditions in China made immigration from this nation a 
viable alternative.  The 1851 Taiping Rebellion, largely focused in southern China, killed 20 
million Chinese citizens by 1864, and the Red Turban revolt similarly claimed around 1 million 
Chinese citizens of Guangdong.  In addition to the already disturbing consequences of these 
rebellions, fighting prevented the application of both government and local resources towards 
land maintenance and disaster relief, resulting in food shortages.15  Circumstances in China, 
particularly in the Guangdong province, clearly encouraged Chinese citizens to leave this 
country, and many would seek refuge in Mexico.              
 United States Consular Agent Harry L. Walsh in Manzanillo, Colima compiled a list of 
names of Chinese immigrants arriving to this port in 1921.  This list presents valuable 
opportunities to understand typical age and gender characteristics of these immigrants.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Robert Chao Romero, “The Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement in Mexico: 1882-1940,” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2003), 32-3. 
14 Ibid., 35-6.   
15 Ibid., 36-8. 
 
 
12
GRAPH 1 
 
Ages of Chinese Immigrants Arriving to Manzanillo, Mexico, 
January 1921-April 1921 
                                                            
 
Source: Consul Harry L. Walsh to the Sec. of State, (Jan. 8, 1921; Feb. 17,1921; Feb. 28, 1921;  Mar. 23, 1921;  
April 19, 1921), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.5593 /37-41, The Ohio State University Libraries. 
 
As Graph 1 demonstrates, most Chinese immigrants recorded in Walsh’s list were under 
the age of 34, and the average age of the Chinese immigrants arriving to this port was 29.8years 
old.  The overwhelming number of male immigrants in this Walsh’s report further validates a 
statement by Bartley F. Yost in Guaymas, Sonora, who commented that, “… only in rare cases 
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do the Chinese bring their wives and families to Mexico.”16  How did these large numbers of 
mostly male immigrants negotiate for prosperous roles in an unfamiliar land?  An exploration of 
Chinese survival strategies and community-building techniques should help to clarify this 
question. 
 
 
The Establishment of Chinese Prosperity and Community  
Chinese immigrants employed a number of strategies in negotiating for prosperity and 
happiness in Mexico.  These strategies included: altering Mexican business models through 
small business operation and the exclusive hiring of Chinese immigrants, forming political 
organizations and mutual aid societies, and starting relationships with Mexican women.  An 
important component for the success of each of these strategies was Mexican political 
acceptance.  Federal Mexican powers would continue to support this community at least midway 
into the second decade of the 20th century.  While this protection eroded near the end of the 
1920’s, additional primary source documentation reveals that during the time leading up to this 
period, Chinese residents in Mexico at the very least enjoyed the nominal support of the Mexican 
federal government.17    Federal military forces perfectly exemplify this trend when they 
thwarted the efforts of the mayor of Cananea, Sonora, to expel Chinese merchants from this city 
in 1920.18  The Mexican government similarly resorted to military power in order to put down 
                                                 
16 Report from Consul Bartley F. Yost entitled, “Mexican Women Prohibited from Marrying Chinese Men,” (Jan. 
13, 1924), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016 /4, The Ohio State University Libraries. 
17 For more on Chinese loss of government protection, see José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo, El movimiento antichino en 
México (1871-1934) (México, D.F.: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1991), 130-3. 
18 Jonustay to MacMurray, (Jan. 12, 1920).  National Archives Record Group 59, 812.5593/21.  The Ohio State 
University Libraries.  
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the previously referenced anti-Chinese riots in northern Sonora in September of 1925.19  In July 
of that same year, Mexican President Plutcaro Elías Calles spoke with the Anti-Chinese League 
of Torreon, Coahuila. While giving his moral sanction to this group’s activities, the Mexican 
president simultaneously demonstrated his respect for Mexico’s 1899 treaty with China by 
warning this group not to violate any laws or international agreements.20  Although these 
examples of federal support of Chinese presence and economic viability in Mexico would not 
continue indefinitely into the future, they prove that the political protection of this group--
initially fomented during the Porfiriato--continued at least midway into the 1920’s.  Such 
protection would temporarily allow Chinese citizens to employ their economic, social, and 
sexual strategies in trying to find a place in Mexican society.  
Chinese immigrants in Mexico negotiated for a comfortable and prosperous place in 
Mexican society by eschewing prevalent economic discourse.   Recall that Mexican political 
leaders, such as Matías Romero, hoped to subjugate Chinese immigrants into a subordinate, 
labor-intensive role.21  Contrary to these leaders’ vision for Chinese immigrants, most Chinese in 
Mexico refused to accept manual labor positions, and a lack of adequate wages constitutes one 
important reason for this refusal.22  Instead, many Chinese became small merchants.   Hu-Dehart 
describes the ascendancy of Sonoran Chinese into roles as “petite bourgeoisie.”  While some 
                                                 
19 Report from Consul Henry C. Damm entitled, “Anti-Chinese Demonstrations in Sonora, Mexico,” (September 5, 
1925), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016/14,  The Ohio State University Libraries.    
20 Bartley F. Yost to Sec. of State, (July 8, 1925), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016/12, The Ohio State 
University Libraries.   
21 Kenneth Cott, “Mexican Diplomacy and the Chinese Issue, 1876-1910,” Hispanic American Historical Review 
67, no.1 (Feb., 1987): 66-7. 
22 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (Laborers) and Huashang 
(Merchants) in Latin America/Caribbean,” in Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, ed. Wanni W. 
Anderson and Robert G. Lee, 78-111 (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 92-93; Leo 
M. Jacques. “Have Quick More Money than Mandarins: The Chinese in Sonora,” The Journal of Arizona History 
17, no. 2 (1976), 211-12.   
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Sonoran Chinese began to manufacture shoes and clothing, others had begun to establish grocery 
stores, restaurants, canteens, and truck farms by 1890.23  
 
Figure 1:Newspaper Advertisement for Chinese-owned  clothing and grocery store in Navojoa, Sonora, heading 
reads, “The Popular…Great Clothing and Grocery Store”    
Source: Report from American Consul General William Dawson entitled “Press in Mexico (Section III)” Feb. 15, 
1929, 812.91/33, enclosure, The National Archives Records Group 59, The Ohio State Libraries 
 
These Chinese firms would often operate near mining camps controlled by U.S. interests in order 
to supply the large number of workers that serviced such operations.  This focus on supplying 
American interests partially helped Chinese owners to sustain economic viability during the 
Mexican Revolution, as American mines continued to operate (and to need supplies) in spite of 
the political turmoil that engulfed the country.24 These Chinese businesses tended to be smaller 
and more ubiquitous than their Mexican counterparts in Sonora, demonstrated by the fact that 
417 Chinese businesses were located in over 65 of the state’s towns in 1925. In comparison, 
sixty-one Mexican-owned businesses were located in significantly fewer municipalities.  While 
                                                 
23 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (Laborers) and Huashang 
(Merchants) in Latin America/Caribbean,” in Displacements and Diasporas: Asians in the Americas, ed. Wanni W. 
Anderson and Robert G. Lee, 78-111 (New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 94. 
24 Ibid., 94-5. 
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these Mexican businesses generally were capitalized at between 5,000 and 99,000 pesos, 91% of 
the Chinese businesses were capitalized under 4,900 pesos.25
Primary source documentation bolsters these claims regarding the economic dominance 
of small Chinese merchants in this state.  For instance, Consul Bartley F. Yost in Guaymas 
commented to the Secretary of State in 1919 that, “At least 75% of the retail grocery trade in this 
part of the State is in the hands of the Chinese.”26  Consul Francis J. Dyer similarly wrote in 
December of that same year: 
“In Hermosillo, one of the leading merchants tells me, ([in] a city of perhaps 15,000 people), there are 90 
small Chinese stores.  In Nogales, the Chinese have nearly all the business, especially dealing in groceries, 
piece goods, notions, household articles of various kinds, tobacco, and so forth.  Some have little tailor 
shops, garment factories, restaurants, and there is a Chinese laundry.27
The American Embassy in Mexico further emphasized the situation in Sonora in a 1924 Foreign 
Service Report.  This report states, “…in several states, especially Sonora and Sinaloa, the 
Chinese are fast obtaining a practical monopoly of small businesses…”28   
While this evidence presents a thorough account of the development of economic 
adaptation on the part of the Chinese in Sonora, additional writings reveal that similar 
circumstances occurred throughout many Mexican municipalities outside of Sonora.  For 
instance, in a letter to the Secretary of State in 1924, Consul James B. Stewart in Tampico, 
Tamaulipas claimed that, “Probably 50% of the bread consumed in Tampico is made at small 
                                                 
25 For the peso figures, as well as for the numbers of businesses and municipalities, see: Ibid., 108. 
26 Bartley F. Yost to the Sec. of State, (July 26, 1919), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.504/192, The Ohio 
State University. 
27 Francis J. Dyer to the Sec. of State, (Dec. 28, 1919), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.5593/17, The Ohio 
State University Libraries. 
28 American Foreign Service Report from the American Embassy in Mexico City (Sept. 17, 1924) National Archives 
Record Group 59, 812.5593/47, The Ohio State University Libraries. 
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Chinese bakeries.”29  Commenting on the situation in Mazatlan, Sinaloa, Consul William E. 
Chapman writes, “there are many Chinese in Mazatlan and in other towns in this Consular 
District, but nearly all of these are engaged in mercantile pursuits of one nature or another…”30  
In a comprehensive report detailing the nature and consequences of Chinese immigration to 
Mexico, Reed Paige Clark similarly describes the tendency of Chinese throughout Mexico to 
compete with poorer Mexicans in small farming, trade, restaurants, and laundries.31  So not only 
did Chinese businesses spread throughout the state of Sonora, rather, a similar trend was taking 
place throughout many Mexican districts. 
In order to further cultivate economic success, many Chinese businesses even developed 
hiring models that were distinct from those traditionally used in Mexico.  Duncan describes a 
trend amongst members of the Chinese community of Baja California to hire mostly single, 
Chinese males.  This practice allowed both owner and employee to live at the establishment and 
to save on overhead costs.32  Widespread Mexican reactions to such hiring models would 
indicate that this trend held forth in other states as well.33  While Duncan’s idea about overhead 
cost reduction seems reasonable, it is equally reasonable to surmise that sharing quarters with 
other Chinese immigrants also provided a sense of companionship and comfort in an unfamiliar 
land.  Economic adaptation of this sort was undoubtedly a key factor in allowing Chinese 
immigrants to Mexico to thrive in their new surroundings. 
                                                 
29 James B. Stewart to the Sec. of State, (Sept. 25, 1924), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.504/579, The 
Ohio State University Libraries. 
30 William E. Chapman to Sec. of State, (Nov. 9, 1920), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.5593/35.  The 
Ohio State University Libraries. 
31 Report from Reed Paige Clark entitled “Immigration of Chinese into Mexico,” (June 5, 1928).  National Archives 
Record Group 59, 812.5593/61.  The Ohio State University Libraries. 
32 Robert. H. Duncan.  “The Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California, 1889-1929,” The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 4 (Nov., 1994), 640.  
33  For more evidence regarding the hiring practices of Chinese immigrants, see page 22. 
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While many Chinese immigrants participated in small businesses, the intensity of this 
participation was not uniform in every state.  U.S. Consular Agent Thomas McEnelly in 
Chihuahua reported in 1924 that, “The great majority of Chinese residing in this district are 
agriculturalists.”34 The size of McEnelly’s consular district is unclear, but a U.S. Consular Office 
most likely would not have been in a rural area.  The comment therefore remains important in 
revealing the varying extent of Chinese participation in small businesses throughout different 
Mexican states.  Chinese immigrants in Northern Baja California also, “[assumed] diverse 
economic roles, ranging from rural laborer to urban capitalist,” and period sources in Duncan’s 
work claim that Chinese farmers raised 80% of the cotton crop in the Mexicali Valley.35  So 
while ubiquitous Chinese businesses prospered and dominated in many areas of Mexico, it is 
important to realize that this trend did not preclude Chinese immigrants from actively 
participating in other economic sectors. 
Forming voluntary organizations and mutual aid societies proved to be another key 
strategy in the establishment and survival of these Chinese communities.  The first of these 
organizations, the Unión Fraternal, sought to promote, “‘unity, mutual aid, and moral, material 
and intellectual improvement of all Chinese citizens’” living in Mexico.36 Although the group 
attempted to complete this goal mainly by responding to Mexican hostility against Chinese 
immigrants, it also undertook efforts to care for its members.37  In describing this point, Hu-
                                                 
34 McEnelly to Sec. of State, (April 22, 1924) National Archvies Record Group 59, The Ohio State University 
Libraries. 
35 Robert. H. Duncan.  “The Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California, 1889-1929,” The 
Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 4 (Nov., 1994), 616, 637. 
36 Evelyn Hu-Dehart, “Voluntary Associations in a Predominantly Male Immigrant Community: The Chinese on 
the Northern Mexican Frontier, 1880-1930,” in Voluntary Associations in the Chinese Diaspora, ed. Khun Eng 
Kuah-Pearce and Evelyn Hu-Dehart, 141-168 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 147-8. 
37 Ibid., 149. 
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Dehart writes, “If any member became ill or had extraordinary needs, UF members collected 
donations from all the chapters [of the organization].”38  Similar societies included the Chee 
Kung Tong, The Asociación Mutualista China de la República Mexicana, and the Partido 
Nacionalista China de la República, which appeared to work mostly for Chinese mainland 
political reforms.39   By forming these organizations and by communicating with each other, 
these immigrants also found, “‘stability and continuity’” while they simultaneously encountered, 
“rapid social change far from home.”40   
In addition to providing this “stability and community,” some societies, such as the 
Partido Nacionalista China de la República, also helped immigrants to share a common 
connection to their homeland by allowing them to continue to participate in Chinese politics.  In 
1927, for instance, “El Partido Nacionalista Chino de Veracruz” issued a handbill in the streets 
of that city advocating Chinese nationalist movements against European and U.S. military 
domination in China: 
We want Europe and the United States to understand that simultaneously with the appearance of every 
foreign warship in our Chinese ports, one-hundred thousand young people launch themselves to flame the 
colors of the nationalist armies.41  
Certainly not solitary or singular in nature, this statement shows just how crucial nationalist 
activities and political groups could be in allowing Chinese immigrants in Mexico to find 
common identity and purpose through a connection to homeland politics. 
 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 150-1, 153, 156. 
40 Ibid., 153-6. 
41 John Q. Wood to American Consul General, (March 5, 1927), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.00B/168, 
The Ohio State University Libraries, translation from Spanish. 
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The Growth of Nationalism and Xenophobia: 1910-1940 
 As revolutionary events shifted dominant thought in Mexico increasingly towards 
nationalistic and xenophobic tendencies, Chinese immigrant groups found themselves in 
increasingly isolated, oppressed positions.  In El movimiento antichino en México, (1871-1934) 
José Jorge Gómez Izquierdo takes a theoretical look at the development of nationalism and 
xenophobia in Mexico.  This author claims that nationalism has traditionally functioned in 
Mexico as a provider of social cohesion made possible through a common loyalty to the Mexican 
nation.  He further argues that xenophobia developed as a component to such nationalism in the 
socially destructive revolution of 1910 because of the growing influence of foreign businesses 
during the Porfiriato.  He even suggests that leaders of revolutionary factions employed concepts 
of both xenophobia and nationalism in order to unite Mexicans under their banners and to widen 
their bases of support. Finally, this author and Charles Cumberland agree that while Mexicans 
directed these virulent, revolutionary ideologies towards citizens of United States, European 
nations, and China, the Chinese immigrants received most of the palpable consequences of this 
situation because of the Chinese government’s inability to support them.42   
As nationalism and xenophobia began to envelop Mexico, tension provided by the armed 
conflict of the revolution allowed these sentiments to develop into violence against Chinese 
immigrants.  However, hostility against this group could also feature a potent mix economic 
actions against Chinese businesses and legal actions against Chinese judicial privileges.  This 
discussion will now examine the nature and consequences of such hostility. 
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One of the clearest manifestations of Mexican aversion to Chinese immigrants focuses on 
physical violence perpetrated against this group.  In May of 1911, Consul G. C. Carothers 
described a massacre of Chinese citizens in Torreon, Coahuila, by Maderists troops: 
At about 6 am, the first Maderists appeared in the city where they were astonished to find that the Federals   
had evacuated.  They first went to the jail and liberated all the prisoners.  A tremendous mob was very soon 
formed and the sacking of the Chinese stores commenced.  Very shortly the murdering of Chinamen was 
begun.  It is estimated that two hundred twenty-four Chinamen were massacred.43
Following correspondence submitted by a different Consular Agent in Torreon three weeks later, 
Cumberland cites 303 as the number of Chinese killed in this attack. Although this author’s 
writings make it clear that the large scale of the attack in Torreon was never repeated, the threat 
of violence against Chinese citizens did not end with this outbreak. 44  William E. Algers 
commented about such threats in 1912: 
There are now in Mazatlan some 100 or more Americans and 300 Chinese, if the Federal troops leave, the 
latter will be in great danger, as an uprising against them would be liable to take place at any moment.45
Two additional Chinese residents of Sonora were murdered in 1913, and 1915 mob violence in 
Nacozari, Sonora resulted in Mexicans stripping Chinese residents of their clothing in the 
streets.46  After the fall of Chihuahua City in 1919 to the forces of Pancho Villa, daily 
newspapers reported that while most foreigners in the city remained unharmed after the 
withdraw of Villa’s troops, “…Villa caused the execution of a large number of the Chinese 
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inhabitants of Chihuahua City.”47  While these instances of physical violence against Chinese 
immigrants certainly were not as common as situations that endangered Chinese economic and 
legal rights, it would not be illogical to presume that the drastic nature of these examples inspired 
an amount of consternation amongst the Chinese community equal to that inspired by such 
economic or legal hostility.  Violence against Chinese immigrants was a prominent feature of 
newly formulated nationalistic sentiment.   
 As armed conflict spread through much of northern Mexico following the onset of the 
revolution in 1910-11, violence propagated by military factions against Chinese businesses also 
became more common.48  Such cases of disruptive actions against Chinese businesses in Mexico 
often accompanied those of physical abuse.  These attacks targeted the successful strategies of 
these immigrants in operating small businesses.  Concordant with this idea, in March of 1913 
Consular Agent Simpich relayed a message to the Sec. of State from another agent in Cananea.  
The message claims that Maderists stationed in a suburb of Cananea not only looted the town’s 
Chinese businesses, but also “[seized] about one hundred horses on streets, property of 
Americans and Mexicans.”49  Looting on the part of revolutionary armies undoubtedly formed 
an important threat to Chinese economic interests.  
 However, other examples of seemingly more chaotic, mob-perpetrated violence against 
Chinese firms remain equally prominent.  These instances sometimes coincided closely with 
those of physical abuse.  Looting of Chinese stores in Sonora in 1915 took place in 
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municipalities such as Torres, Guaymas, Hermosillo, and Corcorit.  During one such episode, 
twenty-three Chinese citizens in Guaymas died.50  William D. Maxwell provides a first-hand 
look at the logistics of such a demonstration in his 1925 letter to the Secretary of State.  
According to Maxwell, groups of Mexicans in Hermosillo organized under the title “The 
Committee” encouraged the city’s lower classes to demonstrate against Chinese immigrants, and 
these leaders joined their followers in displaying both parades and signs reading, “Death to the 
Chino” and, “Out with the Chino.”  Maxwell proceeded to describe an occasion in which such a 
parade developed into the threat of violence as participants lit fires in front of Chinese stores.  
While this specific incident did not directly result in violence against Chinese citizens, it is easy 
to imagine how such demonstrations could lead to bloodshed.51   
One occasion that did lead to violent action against Chinese businesses occurred in 
Torreon in 1926.  Under the leadership of Ernesto Contreras, Hipólito Méndez, Crescencio 
Espinosa, and Juan Pérez, a group known as the Anti-Chinese League of Torreon staged a 
demonstration in that city’s public market.  Before police could intervene, members of this group 
had assaulted 10 Chinese properties.  One of these businesses, La Tosca, lost only 15 pesos.  
However, many others, such as La República, El Eden, and that of Delfino S. Lam lost over 100 
pesos each.  La Gran Lucha, owned by Jesus Chuy, went out of business as a result of the 
attacks, and two Chinese owners, Juan C. Wah and Augustin Sing, dealt with threats to both their 
family and home, respectively.52  Disorderly behavior of this sort, especially when accompanied 
                                                 
50 For accounts of these episodes of looting and violence in Sonora, see: Charles C. Cumberland, “The Sonora 
Chinese and the Mexican Revolution,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 40, no. 2 (May, 1960),195. 
51 William D. Maxwell to Sec. of State, (July,28 1925), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016/13, The Ohio 
State University Libraries. 
52 Bartley F. Yost to Sec. of State, (Jan. 8, 1926), National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4016/16, The Ohio State 
University Libraries.   
 
 
24
by the threat and execution of physical violence, serves as another excellent indicator of how 
drastically dominant opinion regarding Chinese immigrants had changed since the Porfiriato. 
Disruptive behaviors against Chinese firms could also take non-violent forms.  United 
States Vice Consul Chas. W. Doherty provides a vivid description of such actions as he describes 
the closings of foreign owned operations by one Mexican labor union, the Confederación 
Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM).  While this consular agent provides a detailed account of 
the CROM’s closing of a U.S. owned bar in response to the bar’s refusal to hire 80% Mexicans, 
Doherty’s letter also describes similar establishment closings that took place in local Chinese 
bars and restaurants.53     
Other examples of non-violent actions against Chinese firms come from both Tamaulipas 
and Chihuahua.   In 1924, the “Unión de Comerciantes de Abarrotes por Menor” in Tampico, 
Tamaulipas petitioned the governor of this state to create a “Chinese Quarter” where all Chinese 
businesses would be segregated.  This initiative would allow the, “interests of the small Mexican 
merchant [to] be adequately protected.”54  In the same year, Chinese residents of Chihuahua 
reported the drafting of a petition that also called for the segregation of the Chinese residents of 
that state.55 Two years later, at an “anti-Chinese” meeting held in Tampico and attended by 150-
200 people, anti-Chinese organizers “rigorously exhorted” Mexican citizens to “combat” 
Chinese economic competition.56  As each of these examples suggests, antagonism against 
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Chinese businesses represented a major threat to these immigrants’ ability to employ lucrative 
business operations in negotiating for their own survival and prosperity in post-revolutionary 
Mexico. 
Mexican implementation of legal action against Chinese immigrants serves as the third 
and most salient signal of a major change in the basic frameworks of Mexican beliefs.  These 
actions targeted both Chinese business and sexual strategies.  The state of Sonora provides 
abundant examples of legislative action against Chinese immigrants, and comments from local 
and state leaders demonstrate the official, sanctioned nature of anti-Chinese antipathy in this 
state. In December of 1919, Sonoran Governor Adolfo de la Huerta sent a telegram to the 
Sonoran house of deputies that cited “intense antagonism” between Mexicans in Sonora and 
Sinaloa and Chinese residents.  The governor explained that these problems were consequences 
of Chinese monopolies in business and the tendency of Chinese residents to spread diseases.  
These discriminatory attitudes became a tangible part of government policy as de la Huerta 
proceeded to recommend that the Chinese merchants in Cananea be expelled as of January 1, 
1920.57   Three days after newspapers published de la Huera’s telegram, Carlos L. Alvarez, the 
municipal president of Guaymas, issued a similar handbill addressed “To the People of 
Guaymas.”  The handbill contained this scathing statement from the town council of Guaymas 
regarding the “Chinese problem” in Sonora: 
Considering that the expulsion of all elements of Chinese is one of the first necessary principals for the 
progress of the State, since besides absorbing the commerce and riches of the State they have come to be a 
most serious menace to the healthy conservation of our race; considering moreover that the aggressive 
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egoism, with which term it may be characterized, they have reached a state where they ignore our laws by 
extension of their absorbing tentacles in all directions, invading not only the labor belonging to the strong 
sex, but also that which is of the woman, having the advantage of offering their labor, be it manual or 
otherwise, for derisive wages…58
These comments serve to introduce the council’s later plea to higher government authorities to 
check the flow of Chinese immigration.  Such statements, stemming from leaders in both 
legislative and executive positions, illustrate the remarkable degree of acceptance achieved by 
the idea of legal action against these immigrants. 
 The previous statements put forth by local Sonoran officials depict anti-Chinese disdain 
that remained salient amongst government representatives.  Laws promulgated by legislature and 
other powerful officials reinforce the idea that this state’s government supported legal action 
against the Chinese.   In 1919, the Sonoran legislature passed a law known as the Labor and 
Social Prevision Law, which mandated that Mexicans must comprise at least 80% of the 
workforce of foreign-owned businesses.  While some cities, such as Magdalena and Hermosillo, 
threatened Chinese establishments with severe punishments if they did not comply with the new 
law, others, such as Guaymas, delayed in enforcing the decree, instead relying on stringent tax 
measures against Chinese merchants in order to persecute these immigrants.  Around the same 
time, leadership in Hermosillo also appointed a group of doctors to report on the health of 
Chinese merchants and the sanitary quality of their buildings.  Bartley F. Yost commented to the 
Sec. of State that Mexicans intended this measure as a means of putting Chinese people who 
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carried dangerous, infectious diseases out of business.59  The Sonoran legislature continued this 
trend of anti-Chinese legislative action in December of 1923 by passing a bill calling for the 
creation of designated areas of each city into which Chinese citizens could be segregated.60 A 
specific component of the law that prohibited Chinese citizens from establishing “any business 
whatsoever outside of the zone assigned to them” reveals the economic thinking behind such a 
move.61 These examples not only demonstrate the prevalence of legislative action against 
Chinese citizens, but they also show how many of these laws centered on successful Chinese 
economic practices. 
Each of these examples of discrimination against Chinese immigrants hints at a racial 
component to popular expression of nationalism and xenophobia.  What role did race play in 
anti-Chinese sentiment?  Philip A. Dennis attempts to answer this important question in “The 
Anti-Chinese Campaigns in Sonora, Mexico.”  He argues that discrimination against Chinese in 
Sonora evolved from initially targeting Chinese economic success to eventually including racist 
claims that disparaged the “culturally distinct” Chinese way of life.62  As some of the above-
mentioned examples attest, these attacks in Sonora depicted Chinese immigrants as “sickly” 
gamblers and opium dealers.  Similar sentiment also claimed that the Chinese were people who 
ate little in order to save money, and one propagandist even claimed that Chinese men converted 
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Mexican widows into prostitutes.63  In “Traversing Boundaries: Chinese, Mexicans, and Chinese 
Mexicans in the Formation of Gender, Race, and Nation in the Twentieth Century U.S.-Mexican 
Borderlands,” Julia Maria Schiavone Comacho helps to extend this analysis of race outside of 
Sonora by explaining Mexican stereotypes of Chinese as unhealthy.  This author claims that 
Mexican fears of infirm Chinese immigrants stemmed from reports of frequent cholera outbreaks 
in China during this period.64  The existence of groups focused on achieving racial purity such as 
the “Committee on Racial Welfare” in Chihuahua and the “Liga Pro Raza” in Coahuila further 
point to the widespread nature of discrimination specifically focused on race. Following this 
evidence, it is safe to conclude that racist sentiment accompanied xenophobic and nationalistic 
expressions of anti-Chinese sentiment and thereby played a significant role in shaping the 
Chinese experience in Mexico. 
As the Mexican Revolution inspired ideologies of nationalism and xenophobia, popular 
discourse regarding Chinese immigration changed.  Once welcomed into their new homes, these 
immigrants now faced hostility that threatened their physical, economic, and legal rights, and this 
threat would elicit a particular response from the Chinese community.  This response will be 
explained below. 
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Initial Chinese Reactions: A Refusal To Renegotiate 
 Chinese immigrants responded to Mexican antagonism in a number of ways.  They 
unsuccessfully appealed to empowered Mexicans, and they also continued to practice the same 
economic, social, and sexual strategies that had allowed them to negotiate for a prosperous place 
in Mexican society.  Continuing their consolidation of close ties with U.S. economic interests in 
northern Mexico, Chinese citizens also appealed to U.S. government agents for support.   
Chinese immigrants tried to appeal to empowered Mexicans to improve the violent, 
discriminatory situations they faced.  However, primary sources prove that these pleas were 
usually unsuccessful.  For instance, in 1919, the Chinese Chargé d’Affaires sent a note to the 
Mexican Foreign Office protesting against Sonora’s Labor and Social Prevision Law, which 
required companies to employ 80% Mexican workers.  In the note, this diplomat claimed that the 
law ignored article 127 of the Mexican Constitution by failing to create boards of conciliation 
and arbitration through which the law should have functioned.  The Chinese official also argued 
that the law was impractical because of the lack of qualified Mexicans to fill positions vacated by 
foreigners, and also because of a contradictory amendment within the law itself that limited the 
firing of foreigners.65  However convincing this official’s arguments may have sounded, they fell 
on deaf ears; the law not only survived, but Mexican officials eventually began to actively 
enforce it.66  Similar Chinese appeals against taxes on commercial establishments in Guaymas in 
1920 and against a 1924 law prohibiting intermarriage between Mexican women and Chinese 
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men also received little attention, the former, “being rejected by unanimous vote of the 
[Guaymas] council…”67   
As direct dialogue with Mexicans failed, Chinese populations in Mexico rarely attempted 
to change the prosperous strategies that had played an important role in making them targets for 
discrimination.  Instead, these immigrants usually responded to oppression by continuing the 
behaviors and survival strategies that had allowed them to initially adapt to the Mexican 
socioeconomic landscape.  For example, Chinese communities continued familiar business 
tactics by simply refusing to comply with Mexican demands to stop exclusively hiring other 
Chinese.  In 1924, Baja California Governor Abelardo Rodríguez mandated that all businesses in 
his state employ at least 50% Mexicans.68  This move echoed the similar 1919 Labor and Social 
Prevision Law of Sonora, which called for businesses to employ 80% Mexicans. However, the 
Chinese residents of these states evaded enforcement of the decrees in similar ways: they 
claimed that each of their employees owned a share in the business, and so the businesses were 
therefore devoid of any employees.69  Both of these ideas seem consistent with the reporting of 
Chicago Tribune writer John Cornyn.  In an article from March 13, 1928, Cornyn reports that, “a 
member of the Mexican Congress” complained about this unique form of community formation:  
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Chinese have formed large ‘joint stock companies,’ in which every Chinese laborer is a stockholder, thus 
avoiding the law, which requires all companies to employ seventy per cent Mexican labor.70
Benjamin Ungson, representing both the Chinese in Sonora as well as the Chinese Unión 
Fraternal, further elucidated the logic behind Chinese resistance to Sonora’s 1919 Labor and 
Social Prevision Law in a July 28 letter to Bartley F. Yost.  Ungson first protests the law using 
judicial reasoning, and he points out the law’s incongruence with multiple articles in the 
Mexican Constitution.  He further states that the law is morally wrong because it discriminates 
based on nationality, claiming, “Civilized nations by means of titanic struggles ridded 
themselves of such discrimination long ago.” Finally, this Chinese leader argues against the law 
from a practical standpoint:  
Immediately we have the case of the employer who already has foreigners in his establishment.  It is 
practically impossible for him to discharge his employees, for they are his co-workers for the success of his 
business and they are possessed of the professional secrets upon which demand his trade, his commerce, his 
products, etc. etc.  The employer who should do so would have to train anew the employees that would 
come to him by the law’s decree, and he would have to begin again the drudgery that he had commenced 
long before, for nobody thinks that the employee who was an errand boy only yesterday is today an 
amanuensis or a clerk, and in a short time may be the foreman of the factory…71
This evidence shows the reluctance of Chinese merchants to follow Sonora’s labor law.  The 
exclusive hiring of Chinese workers in Chinese businesses had played an important role in this 
group’s economic success and community formation in Mexico, and these immigrants 
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subsequently refused to renegotiate this business practice even as the revolutionary growth of 
nationalism and xenophobia increasingly demanded such changes.  
Recall that one Chinese adaptation strategy involved reliance on group cohesion and 
mutual aid societies. Chinese residents would also continue to depend on this tactic after the 
onslaught of Mexican hostility.  For instance, while commenting about Tampico in 1924, James 
B. Stewart stated, “There are probably 3,000 Chinese in Tampico and vicinity and also a Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, which has been quite active in the past year or so in looking after the 
interests of its members.”72  In 1926, Bartley F. Yost described actions of the Chinese National 
League in requesting that the Chinese Minister in Mexico City demand protection from the 
federal government of Mexico.73  In addition to confronting Mexican authorities via these 
groups, Chinese immigrants also relied on group representation in asking U.S. residents and 
officials for help.   For instance, the Fraternal Union of Nogales approached Consular Agent 
Dyer in 1919 in order to discuss U.S. protection of Chinese interests.74  In 1924, two Chinese 
merchants from Torreon who represented Chinese-Mexicans in that city requested the “moral 
support” of the U.S. Consulate, and this request further demonstrates these immigrants’ group 
mentality.75   
As mentioned earlier, Chinese residents also turned to U.S. officials’ support, and this 
move also reflected successful economic relationships between these two groups.  In order to 
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place this strategy in context and to elucidate the powerful position of U.S. interests in Mexico, it 
is important to review the very different circumstances and situations that faced U.S. interests 
and immigrants to Mexico.   
As it had with Chinese immigrants, political acceptance of foreign presence in Mexico 
encouraged citizens of the United States to invest their time and capital in this country, especially 
during the Porfiriato.  By 1910, 28,639 U.S. citizens had immigrated to Mexico, and they 
constituted Mexico’s largest foreign minority at the time.76  Vázquez and Meyer detail the 
substantial amount of U.S. capital that investors often placed in Mexican railroad and oil 
endeavors, and these authors signal this investment as one cause of U.S. immigration to 
Mexico.77   
 The federal government of the United States often ensured the dominant acceptance of 
these U.S. citizens and U.S. investments.  For instance, ambassador Henry Lane Wilson meddled 
extensively in Mexican politics in 1913 in order to both remove Mexican president Fransisco 
Madero from power and to bring about a regime that could protect U.S. lives and interests. 78  
Some U.S. Consular Agents even resorted to militaristic measures in order to protect U.S. 
investments. Consular agents called in naval support in order to stifle strikes at a U.S. owned 
company in 1917 and in order to quell anti-foreign antipathies in 1913.79 Other instances of 
intervention by the United States’ government on behalf of its citizens in Mexico were destined 
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to continue throughout the 1920’s and into the 1930’s, even after the conclusion of the relatively 
violent stages of the Mexican Revolution.80  Figure 4 presents an entertaining look at the wide, 
undeniable base of U.S. power in this country. 
Given this overwhelming display of force on the of  part a non-threatening power in 
Mexico, it is not difficult to imagine why Chinese immigrants would have viewed U.S. presence 
as potentially beneficial, and appeals by Chinese immigrants to U.S. officials follow such logic.  
In September of 1911, Consular Agent Luther T. Ellsworth reported that an angry mob of 
citizens in Ciudad Porfirio Diaz broke doors and windows of buildings owned by Chinese, U.S., 
Spanish, and other foreign populations.  According to his report, these immigrant groups each 
asked for the help of the Consular Agent, who wrote a letter to municipal president Rafael 
Muzquiz.81
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Figure 4 (above) 
Chinese immigrants did not have to look far to find a possible source of power and protection.82
 
Statements from Chinese refugees in 1916 further demonstrate this trend of Chinese 
immigrants appealing to U.S. forces for help.  In that year, Consular Agent Blocker claimed to 
receive a credible report from an intelligence officer working for the United States Army.  The 
report states that, “Chinese refugees from Jimenez continue to report general massacre [of] 
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compatriots, Arabs, Spaniards, Japanese, and one American, who was burned at the stake.”83  
The complete accuracy of such a claim seems questionable; it is difficult to believe that U.S. 
officials who were willing to call in naval support in order to stifle strikes (see above) would 
tolerate such grotesque violence against one of their citizens.  It is also reasonable to conclude, 
however, that Chinese refugees stood to gain from contact with a powerful ally who also felt 
threatened by Mexicans.  So even though the Chinese informants probably exaggerated the 
claims regarding the torture of a U.S. citizen, this report provides an instructive look at one way 
that Chinese citizens could perhaps indirectly appeal to U.S. power.  U.S. influence in Mexico 
unquestionably encouraged Chinese citizens to seek aid from this source. 
For their part, U.S. agents and even the U.S. government often responded favorably to 
Chinese appeals.  Antagonized Chinese citizens in both Cananea and Guaymas asked for U.S. 
support in 1919 and 1920, respectively.  When the municipal president of Cananea ordered the 
closing of all Chinese merchant operations by January 1, 1920, representatives from the Chinese 
Fraternal Union asked Consul Dyer to intercede on their behalf.  Dyer subsequently wrote a letter 
to Sonoran Governor Adolfo de la Huerta on behalf of the Chinese in Cananea.84  In response to 
similar pleas for protection from Chinese residents of Guaymas, Consular Agent Bartley F. Yost 
even shared a meeting with the municipal president of Guaymas in which the former advocated 
for Chinese rights.85  While working in Ciudad Juarez, Consular Agent Edwards informed both 
Chinese and Japanese citizens in 1911 that his Consulate would take care of them if danger 
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arose.86  Demonstrating a similar pattern of interaction between these groups, Consular Agent 
Carothers in Torreon reported that after the massacre of Chinese citizens in May of 1911, 
residents from the U.S. donated money in order to feed the Chinese refugees.87  Other reports 
claimed that Carothers even went as far as sheltering thirty Chinese citizens in his home.88  In 
September of 1919, the U.S. Secretary of State sent these instructions to every U.S. Consular 
Agent in Mexico: 
At request [of the] Chinese Legation here, you are instructed, in case of necessity, to exercise your informal 
good offices  with local Mexican authorities in behalf of Chinese in your District seeking protection.89
Why would the U.S. representatives and authorities in Mexico lend a hand to Chinese 
immigrants?  Certainly political thinking in the United States featured no component of Chinese 
favoritism; the 1882 Exclusion Act prohibiting Chinese workers from entering the country 
proves this point.  Perhaps the answer lies in both Hu-Dehart’s and Duncan’s revelations of the 
economic ties between these two groups.  Not only did Chinese merchants often supply U.S. 
mining interests, but they also enjoyed a business relationship with commercial suppliers in the 
United States.90   
Another answer to the question of the seemingly Janus-faced policies of U.S. officials 
towards Chinese immigrants may lie in the failure of U.S. representatives to ultimately protect 
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Chinese immigrants from further harassment.  Despite the massive power of the U.S. 
government that backed its agents in Mexico, U.S. agents largely allowed their Mexican 
counterparts to ignore appeals on behalf of Chinese immigrants. For instance, even though 
Consul Dyer wrote letters to the governor of Sonora on behalf of Chinese citizens in Cananea in 
1920, this agent states, “I have little hope that my appeal will be effective.”91   This analysis 
proved to be correct, as only federal military intervention prevented Chinese expulsion.  
Similarly, in 1924, Bartley F. Yost responded to Chinese complaints regarding the propaganda 
campaign of the Torreon Liga Pro Raza by visiting with municipal president Sr. Ramon Farias, 
who subsequently promised to help to stop the campaign.  However, these actions proved to be 
useless, as Mexican President Calles gave the anti-Chinese group his moral support a year 
later.92  And even though U.S. establishments in 1929 Mexicali “joined their Chinese associates 
by rejecting the [CROM’s] demands” regarding enforcement of the 80% Mexican labor law, 
these U.S. businesses, as well as their Chinese counterparts, eventually decided to abide by the 
law.93  Chinese citizens and groups often turned to U.S. power as a source of protection, but 
Mexican politics and popular thought responded coldly to this strategy. U. S. agents proved 
unwilling to force the development of real change in Mexican policy, and as a result, Chinese 
citizens dealt with discrimination and confrontation without much outside support. 
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Mexican Responses: Nationalistic Sentiments Solidify… 
 Not surprisingly, dominant Mexican thought did not respond favorably to Chinese 
insistence on continuing familiar forms of cultural agency.  In response to this trend, Mexicans 
largely increased the discrimination and harassment that had initially served as manifestations 
against Chinese cultural practices.  For instance, Chinese reliance on support groups and mutual 
aid societies led to continued discrimination and racism against Chinese immigrants in Mexico’s 
new political landscape.  Rivalries between mutual aid societies such as the Kuomintang (KMT) 
and the Chee Kung Tong (CKT) often led to the murders and denouncements of Chinese by 
other Chinese, and Mexicans did not fail to notice this development.  In Sonora, some Mexicans 
exhibited racist ideologies by labeling Chinese citizens as “ ‘natural criminal elements,’”  and 
Hu-Dehart details further the costs of this group reliance in Sonora when she claims that 
preoccupations with inter-group conflict left the mutual aid societies unable to protect members 
against Mexican political aggression.94  Chinese employment of a familiar form of cultural 
agency, when combined with new, Mexican thought regarding these immigrants, ultimately led 
to continued, negative consequences for the Chinese.   
 The large scale exiling of Chinese immigrants from Mexico constituted another important 
consequence of continued cultural agency.  These expulsions often resulted from Chinese 
insistence on maintaining their successful economic strategies.  Robert Chao Romero cites 
general population statistics in attempting to show the scope of the expulsion campaigns in The 
Dragon in Big Lusong. While Chinese citizens in Mexico numbered 24,218 in 1926, this number 
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had dropped to 4,856 by 1940.95  Gómez Izquierdo’s work offers more detail to describe the 
evolution of these expulsions.  As Sonoran politicians centralized their national power with the 
creation of the PNR and the defeat of its enemies near the beginning of the 1930s, PNR party 
members began direct involvement in the anti-Chinese campaign.  The new security of Sonoran 
power at a federal level allowed for the further execution of anti-Chinese policy in traditionally 
discriminatory states, as well as the expansion of the campaign to newer areas.96 PNR party 
members also helped to form the Comité Directivo de la Compaña Nacionalista Antichina de la 
Cámara de Diputados, and the Mexican government sanctioned stringent, extreme application of 
the 1928 Ley de Migración.97  
 State and local persecutions of Chinese immigrants followed similar patterns, and many 
led to the expulsion of Chinese citizens.  As Chinese in Sonora refused to comply with attempts 
to enforce the Social Prevision and Labor Law, the state’s governor ordered all Chinese 
businesses to leave the state by September 5, and Jacques writes that, “The expulsion decree 
prompted many Chinese to close their shops and to sell all their goods” before being deported by 
authorities via cattle car.98  3,000 Chinese people had left the state by 1932, and the drastic 
nature of this number becomes apparent when we consider that only 3,517 Chinese men and 412 
Chinese women resided in the state in 1930 (Gómez Izquierdo specifies here that many of the 
“Chinese women” were probably married Mexican women).  By 1940, there were 92 Chinese 
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citizens left in Sonora.99  These displaced populations usually went to other Mexican states or to 
Arizona, and most that entered Arizona (or other locations in the United States) eventually 
returned to China.100
 Sinaloa employed similar measures to reduce its Chinese populations, as widespread calls 
for Chinese citizens to obey that state’s 90% labor law led to the governor’s expulsion order in 
1933.  Anti-Chinese efforts in both Baja California and Chihuahua led the Chinese population in 
these three states (Sinaloa included) to drop from 6899 in 1930 to 1303 by 1940.  In Coahuila, 
local anti-Chinese groups led the charge against Chinese citizens of that state, often forming 
physical blockades in front of Chinese business establishments in order to prevent them from 
making profits.  That state’s Chinese population dropped from 918 in 1930 to 256 in 1940.  
Precipitous drops in Chinese populations also occurred in Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Chiapas.101   
The conflict between Chinese strategies of cultural agency and survival and Mexican 
expectations for these immigrants had clearly come to a breaking point, and the Mexicans 
attempted to settle the argument with increased racism, discrimination, and eventually the 
expulsion of Chinese citizens. 
 However, as Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent explain in their introduction to 
Everyday Forms of State Formation, the exercise of state power rarely takes the form of a one 
way street.  Rather, a society (and its history) is better described as a constant struggle between 
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popular and state propagated ideologies that results in a mixture of the two.102  The same logic 
can be applied to Chinese immigrants to Mexico.  While it may seem as though the Mexican 
state effectively crushed this community through continued harassment and eventually through 
expulsion, examples of Chinese negotiation emerge from these circumstances that prevent 
history from viewing these events in such black and white terms.  For instance, Bartley F. Yost 
proves the agency of these immigrants by pointing out their economic power in a 1920 letter to 
the Secretary of State: 
Confidently, it may be added that this agitation against the Chinese, at least as far as this district [Guaymas] 
is concerned, appears to come from State authorities, and is not by the wish or the agitation of the people in 
general, or even the municipal authorities, for the latter well know that if the Chinese merchants are driven 
out the city’s revenues will be reduced at least 75%...103
Yost elaborates on similar themes in a 1925 letter that explains the lack of enforcement of 
Sonoran laws that called for the segregation of Chinese citizens into barrios. The consular agent 
claims that a reduction of tax payments would follow the “ruin” of Chinese merchants who were 
forced into barrios, and Yost even predicts that the consequences would “bankrupt” local and 
state governments.104  
In “Have Quick More Money Than Mandarins,” Leo M. Jacques suggests that the 
Chinese immigrants realized the economic power suggested in Yost’s letters.  This author claims 
that Chinese control of grocery supplies and tax revenue allowed these immigrants to “cut off 
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supplies or to bribe officials” in advocating for better treatments.105  This exercise of agency 
would have particularly important consequences when Sonoran authorities finally moved to 
enforce 80% labor laws in 1930.  In order to protest this law, Chinese merchants in Sonora 
simply closed their doors, depriving municipal areas of food and economic revenue.106  When 
this response elicited expulsion orders from Sonoran governor Francisco Elías, Chinese 
merchants attempted to sell all of their products in order to leave Mexico with as much money as 
possible.  In the end, the exit of the Chinese merchants cost the Sonoran state treasury around 
800,000 pesos per year, and Mexican taxes could recuperate only one-third of the amount that 
the Chinese had paid.107  The departure of these immigrants also reduced Mexican food and 
agricultural products, and Dennis suggests that the “exodus” of these immigrants put the Bank of 
Sonora out of business and nearly bankrupted the state government.108  Each of these examples 
show how, despite their apparent defeat at the hands of their Mexican antagonists, Chinese 
populations in Mexico could continue to negotiate for circumstances that would prove to be 
simultaneously beneficial to immigrant groups and detrimental to dominant, Mexican forces.       
  Throughout the process of their expulsion, Chinese immigrants also continued to exercise 
agency by negotiating for specific sexual privileges that would later prove to be disadvantageous 
for the Mexican state.  This study will now detail the role of gender throughout the development 
of anti-Chinese sentiment in Mexico in order to properly contextualize this strategy. 
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The Role of Gender 
Gender played an important role in shaping the Chinese experience in Mexico.  Chinese-
Mexican intermarriages proved to be one important strategy in the survival of Chinese 
immigrants, and consular records confirm this idea.  Bartley F. Yost described such a trend in 
1924: 
 In the past not a few Chinese men married Mexican women, as only in rare cases do the Chinese bring their 
wives and families to Mexico.  There are many illicit unions between Chinese men and Mexican women.109     
Henry C.A. Damm similarly reports that, “Most Chinese are of the male sex, very few have 
families here, but marriages with Mexican women are not infrequent.”110  Reed Paige Clark 
claimed that 1928 Chihuahua was the site of “considerable intermarriage.”111  John E. Jones in 
Agua Prieta, Sonora also stated that by 1928, “No small number [of the Chinese immigrants] 
have naturalized as Mexican citizens and many have married native women.”112   
Chinese intermarriage with Mexican women was one idea that particularly disturbed 
many Mexican citizens, and comments from disgruntled Mexicans themselves illustrate how this 
sentiment could develop into restrictive, legal action against this practice.  The town council of 
Guaymas claimed that an important problem of Chinese immigration was, “…the injection of the 
sickly yellow blood which we fatally have to suffer in accepting it into our families.”113  
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Consular Agent Francis J. Dyer similarly reported in 1920 that some Mexicans felt that Chinese 
immigrants were unclean, that they carried diseases, and that they were, “introducing oriental 
blood into the communities where they live.”  According to Dyer, these claims served to 
supplement arguments that Chinese immigrants should be segregated.114  Echoing these hostile 
feelings regarding these relationships, the State of Sonora passed a law in 1923 forbidding 
marriages and “illicit” unions between Mexican women and Chinese men. 
In Chihuahua, “The Committee on Racial Welfare,” which claimed to be leading a “truly 
nationalist movement in favor of the race,” issued a circular that called for the coming together 
of men of Latin American blood.  It also made opposite suggestions regarding unions with 
Chinese people, claiming that such unions represented, “a grave danger for the development and 
progress of our nation.”115  In line with these sentiments, the state of Chihuahua officially 
outlawed intermarriage in 1932.    
Torreon, Coahuila, was also the site of convergent measures of sexual discrimination.  In 
this city, the “Liga Pro-Raza” held weekly meetings in which members directed citizens to 
discriminate against the Chinese via boycotts and excessive taxes.  Yost claims that “…when the 
subject of marriages between Mexican women and Chinese men [was] broached [at the 
meetings], the excitement of the crowd [reached] a dangerous degree, and [was] liable to lead to 
violence.”116   In 1925, some Mexican citizens of Torreon proposed a law against intermarriage 
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similar to that of Sonora.117  In a society where physical violence, economically disruptive 
behavior, and legal action against both Chinese citizens and their adaptation strategies had 
become commonplace, not even Chinese sexual practices escaped the threatening scrutiny of 
Mexican manifestations of nationalism and xenophobia. 
Similar to the ways in which they continued to practice familiar economic and group-
cohesion strategies, Chinese men exhibited an unwillingness to change their behaviors or to 
compromise with their Mexican dominators when faced with laws propagating sexual 
discrimination. Instead, many Chinese men continued their relations with Mexican women.  
Bartley F. Yost proves this as he details the results of Sonora’s restriction on intermarriage, 
saying, “[the restriction] has given rise to clandestine unions.”118  The U.S. Consul in Mexico 
City supported this assertion in a 1928 report, claiming, “...despite the [Sonoran] State law, there 
is considerable intermarriage between Chinese and natives.”119 Additional evidence would be 
useful in speaking to this trend both inside and outside of Sonora.  However, it is difficult to 
imagine that Chinese men without wives (in Mexico) would gladly acquiesce to discriminatory 
legislation in any state.   Again, Chinese immigrants’ tendency to balk at proposed changes to 
their intimate relationships echo similar tendencies to maintain successful adaptation strategies in 
spite of the emergence of hostile threats to such tactics.    
Restrictive changes in Chinese-Mexican intermarriage laws also discriminated against the 
Mexican women who were involved in these culturally diverse relations, and discrimination 
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against women had precedence in Mexican gender history.  Even before the advent of Chinese-
Mexican intermarriages, Mexican women rarely received equal rights and considerations vis-à-
vis men in Mexican society.  Mexican legal discourse proves this society’s often discriminatory 
and protectionist stances towards women.  Acting as Mexico’s executive authority, Venustiano 
Carranza published a law in 1917 concerning family relations.  While some clauses within this 
law attempted to establish equality in the home between men and women, other decrees called 
for sharply divided gender roles.  For instance, Carranza’s law signaled men as the primary 
income owners of households.  While it permitted women to supplement family incomes, the law 
stipulated that women’s contributions should only account for half of the family’s total earnings.  
Carranza gave power over household affairs and child rearing to women.120  It is easy to surmise 
that such prevalent notions of specific gender roles in Mexican society could lead to feelings of 
inequality amongst parties who wished to cross gendered boundaries.  The Queretaro 
Constitution of 1917, a document that would serve as the foundation for Mexico’s post-
revolutionary government, further propagated discriminatory and protectionist stances towards 
women at a federal level as it specifically prohibited the performance of “dangerous” labor by 
both women and children.121  
Discrimination against women was also common in the discourse of state governments, 
and such a trend can be discerned from state policies on divorce.  For instance, Sonoran law in 
1928 stipulated that the act of adultery by a wife was always cause for divorce, while adultery by 
a husband required further circumstances in order to make divorce legitimate (these 
                                                 
120 Consul (Name Illegible) to Sec. of State, June 1917, National Archives Record Group 59, 812.4054/3, enclosure, 
The Ohio State University Libraries. 
121 Parker to Sec. of State, Feb 7, 1917, National Archives Records Group 59, 812.011/31, enclosure, The Ohio State 
University Libraries.  
 
 
48
circumstances included instances in which the husband committed adultery in the home he 
shares with his wife).  Men could also file for divorce if their wives gave birth to “illegitimate” 
children that were conceived prior to the marriage, and Sonoran law stipulated that women who 
gained custody of their children following divorces could lose this privilege if they later gave 
birth to an illegitimate child.  And while the legal discourse forced women to wait 300 days after 
their divorce in order to remarry, no such law appears to have applied to males.  Finally, Sonoran 
law displayed ideas of protectionism towards women as it required husbands to work in order to 
provide their ex-wives with food.  Not surprisingly, this stipulation hinged on the woman’s 
willingness to lead an “honest life” and remain unmarried. 122
Legal policies didn’t treat Mexican women much better in other states.  For instance, 
divorce legislation in Tobasco in 1926 required a 180 day “waiting period” similar to that of 
Sonora for women who wished to remarry.123  Yucatan law in 1923 required 300 days.124  Each 
of these examples shows how state-level policies could help to perpetuate unequal treatment of 
women in Mexican society.    
Even comments from individual Mexicans point to women’s second class treatment.  
Statements published in El Borchazo, a bi-weekly Mexican newspaper, prove this point:  
When you eat at a Chinese restaurant, or when you have your clothes washed at a Chinese laundry, you are 
helping the enemies of the poor Mexican woman (emphasis my own).125
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By calling for Mexicans to protect their women at the expense of the Chinese, such a 
statement displays aspects of paternalism and gender inequality in Mexican society.  A handbill 
issued by the Municipal President of Guaymas in the same year more blatantly expresses 
dominant perceptions of women in Mexican society.  In the handbill, the council of Guaymas 
argues that Chinese men have invaded, “…not only the labor belonging to the strong sex, but 
also that which is of woman…”126  It is clear from these examples that gender discrimination in 
Mexico existed on federal, state, and local/individual levels.127
   As a result of the conflict over Mexican-Chinese cultural and gender relations, 
discrimination against Mexican women only intensified.  According to Gómez Izquierdo, 
Mexican women lost their nationality in Mexico when they married Chinese men.  This point 
substantiates the author’s later, concordant claim that population statistics of Chinese women in 
Mexico could be distorted by Mexican women that authorities simply counted as Chinese.  This 
loss of women’s citizenship would be one form of continued harassment against Chinese-
Mexican families that would prove to have important effects on subsequent cultural negotiations 
between immigrant groups and the Mexican state.128   
Conflictive Chinese-Mexican gender relations would continue as Chinese men took their 
Mexican wives and children back to China following their expulsion.  In order to better 
understand the consequences of the Chinese departure on Mexican gender relations, it would be 
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beneficial to review the circumstances that faced Mexican women in China.  In “Traversing 
Boundaries: Chinese, Mexicans, and Chinese Mexicans in the Formation of Gender, Race, and 
Nation in the Twentieth Century U.S.-Mexican Borderlands,” Julia Maria Schiavone Comacho 
completes a thorough analysis of these circumstances.  In describing Mexican women who left 
Mexico to return with their husbands to China, this author cites Mexican Honorary Vice Consul 
in Shanghai Mauricio Fresco in describing these women “stateless.”129  Mexican law, following 
a common trend in international foreign policy, forced Mexican women who married foreigners 
to accept citizenship in the spouse’s country and to give up Mexican citizenship.130  Despite 
Chinese marriage laws that prohibited polygamy, Chinese social tradition encouraged this 
practice, and China simultaneously deprived Mexican women of citizenship by only 
acknowledging a man’s first marriage as legitimate.131   
To exacerbate the situation of the 600 women who immigrated to China between 1931 
and 1933, social conditions in China remained less than ideal.  Schiavone Camacho’s research 
suggests that many Chinese citizens were angry at Mexicans and Mexican society for the poor 
treatment of their comrades in Mexico.  As a result, Mexican women became likely targets for 
discrimination in Chinese society.132  Chinese men did not always prove willing to soften the 
impacts of this discrimination; Mexican women repeatedly complained to consuls about poor 
treatment and abandonment by their husbands.133     
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To be certain, not all Mexican women were treated poorly by their Chinese husbands in 
China.  Schiavone Camacho details instances of committed relationships that continued in 
China.134  However, many of those who did feel that their treatment in China had become 
intolerable eventually resorted to their own forms of creative agency in rectifying this situation.  
For instance, many immigrated away from their husband’s smaller towns and families and into 
larger metropolitan cities like Macao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Nanking.135  These larger cities 
offered economic opportunities, easy access to ports with ships returning to Mexico, multiethnic 
populations that could make Mexican women feel less foreign, and the protection of nearby 
consulates.136  These consulate services would play a huge role in another strategy of these 
women: direct appeal for protection and repatriation to Mexico.  Mexican women continued to 
complain about their treatment in China, and they similarly began to ask consular services to 
allow them to return to Mexico.137
Partially owing to the task of gaining international legitimacy, the Mexican state would 
be forced to intervene on behalf of the very citizens whose families it had earlier expelled from 
Mexico.138 Many Mexican women did eventually return to their native land, and these 
repatriations followed important changes in the policy of Mexico’s federal government regarding 
these women.  By 1932, the government had decided that Mexican marriages with Chinese men 
were invalid if the man had already been legally married in China.  In accordance with this 
policy, these women remained Mexican citizens, and gained access to consulate protection and 
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passport rights.139  By 1937, the Mexican government under the leadership of Lorenzo Cardenas 
allocated 94,000 pesos to pay for the repatriation of nearly 400 mistreated Mexican women and 
Chinese-Mexican children.  Schiavone-Camacho’s work suggests that a primary inspiration for 
this action was the prospect of war between China and Japan and the negative consequences for 
Mexican women in China that would result.140  By bargaining for their return to Mexico, these 
women show how even subalterns who are expelled from a country can continue to engage in 
negotiations with dominant power.  
However, while many of these women and children did successfully return to Mexico, 
Schiavone-Camacho seems accurate in claiming that Mexico’s gender policy still refused to fully 
consider Mexican women’s concerns.  Not only did Cardenas’ repatriation program not include 
the Chinese men who comprised important parts of some Chinese-Mexican families, but many 
Mexican women again faced discriminatory treatment upon return to their homeland.141   
Mexican stereotypes regarding the prevalence of diseases in China led health authorities to 
detain Mexican women and their children in port cities for extensive periods of time, and labels 
of “diseased” and “foreign” could follow Mexican women and their children as they attempted to 
reintegrate themselves into Mexican society.142 As the author herself keenly points out, the 
actions of women in creating discourse surrounding their eventual repatriation “influenced ideas 
of citizenship and nationality, as well as foreign policy, during this crucial period in Mexico’s 
national and international formation.”143  It is clear that gender issues played an important role in 
shaping the Chinese experience in Mexico.  Not only did relationships with Mexican women 
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help Chinese men to find prosperity in a new country, but the eventual repatriation of Mexican 
women (courtesy of the Mexican government) proves that these Chinese-Mexican families could 
continue to negotiate with state power even through a process of expulsion.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 Porfirio Diaz and dominant Mexican political thought had largely welcomed the 
immigration of Chinese citizens for economic reasons during the latter half of the 19th century 
and the first decade of the 20th.  This group developed into a viable, stable community by defying 
Mexican discourse of Chinese citizens as wage laborers, by forming mutual aid societies, and by 
forming relationships with Mexican women.  However, as social revolution changed ideologies 
in Mexico from xenophilia to nationalism tinted with xenophobia, these strategies, negotiations, 
and bargains that had allowed for Chinese prosperity in this country became antithetic to 
Mexican political thought.  These developments placed Chinese citizens in a drastic, oppressed 
position, and as a result, these immigrants encountered physical, economic, and legal assault.   
In response to such threats, Chinese immigrants unsuccessfully appealed to both Mexican 
and U.S. authorities, and they also continued the familiar survival practices that had allowed 
them to initially adapt to their new surroundings.  However, the intolerable nature of these 
techniques in contemporary Mexican thought ultimately led to a confrontation between 
Mexicans and Chinese, the latter refusing to discontinue their practices.  In the end, many 
Chinese immigrants were forced to leave Mexico, but even this departure remained characterized 
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by adapted forms of cultural negotiations that simultaneously benefited the immigrants while 
irritating dominant thought.  
To point out that Chinese immigrants initially refused to renegotiate their success in 
Mexico is not to blame these immigrants for their own demise.  It is important to remember that 
nationalistic fervor in Mexico asked Chinese immigrants to renegotiate favorable circumstances 
and prosperity.  To change business practices, sexual practices, and a tradition of group 
dependence that had been developing in response to Mexican socioeconomic conditions over a 
number of decades would have been both an improbable and impractical task.   Additionally, it is 
difficult to surmise whether the explosion of nationalism in Mexico would have allowed the 
Chinese immigrants to reach any compromise in this situation.  By 1938, Mexican nationalism 
and anti-foreign sentiment had even grown to such epic proportions as to encourage Mexican 
authorities to challenge a familiar tormentor, the United States, by nationalizing U.S. oil 
interests.  The consequences for the Chinese community, if unable to be blamed on the Chinese 
themselves, more appropriately fit as the logical results of nationalistic insistence on an end to 
the strategies and practices that had made foreign groups like the Chinese so successful.    
This study suggests direction for further research.  The correspondences of the U.S. 
Consular Agents, which serve as the work’s most important primary sources, illuminate U.S. 
perspectives regarding these events, and they also provide a limited look at Mexican perspectives 
through first-hand observations of demonstrations, translations of speeches and newspapers, etc.  
However, their weakness lies in their obvious pro-U.S. sentiments (recall that U.S. thought 
varied widely from time to time regarding Chinese people), as well as in their inability to directly 
communicate the unfiltered thoughts and words of Chinese citizens.  A useful follow-up to this 
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investigation could focus on sources that relay the direct, personal perspectives of both the 
Chinese and Mexican participants in these events. 
Regional expansion of the study could also enhance its claims.  Due to the wide 
availability of evidence regarding immigrant groups who settled in northern Mexican states, this 
study focuses mainly on these regions.  However, Chinese populations also settled in areas that 
this study largely excludes, such as Yucatan and Chiapas.  Future investigations could elaborate 
upon the consequences of revolutionary changes for immigrants in these states.  It is also 
important to remember that discrimination against Chinese citizens was not uniformly witnessed 
throughout all of Mexico; Robert H. Duncan repeatedly states that Chinese in Northern Baja 
California, for instance, usually received better treatment than their neighbors in Sonora.   His 
research shows that, contrary to Mexican perceptions of Chinese residents in Sonora, Chinese 
immigrants in Baja participated in a wide range of economic ventures.144  Further studies could 
examine what, if any, connection exists between economic function of Chinese residents and 
levels of discrimination against them in a wider range of Mexican states and regions.     
 This work, then, presents a basic examination of the strategies of cultural negotiation that 
allowed a particular immigrant group to survive in the radically different circumstances of a new 
country.  While Chinese strategies made them initially successful in Mexico, shifting Mexican 
discourse during and after the Mexican Revolution made these strategies targets for violence, 
racism, and discrimination.  Chinese citizens initially declined to renegotiate their behavioral 
patterns as changes in the world around them made these strategies largely untenable: such a 
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renegotiation would have required excessive and impractical changes on the part of the Chinese 
immigrants. As a result of their refusal to change their successful practices, Mexican state power 
forced many Chinese citizens to leave the country, but many of these immigrants managed to 
undertake a final, different form of cultural negotiation by emigrating away from Mexico on 
their own terms.  While further investigation can undoubtedly add relevant perspective and extra 
detail, the study adds to historical scholarship examples of agency and adaptation strategies that 
prove both effective and subject to change at divergent historical moments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57
Selected Bibliography 
Cott, Kenneth. “Mexican Diplomacy and the Chinese Issue, 1876-1910.”  The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 67, no. 1 (Feb., 1987): 63-85.  
http://www.jstor.org/(accessed  Aug. 7, 2007.). 
 
Cumberland, Charles C. “The Sonora Chinese and the Mexican Revolution.” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 40, no. 2 (May, 1960): 191-211.  
http://www.jstor.org/(accessed Aug. 7, 2007). 
 
Dennis, Philip A.  “Anti-Chinese Campaigns in Sonora, Mexico.”  Ethnohistory 26 no.1 (Winter 
1979): 65-80.  http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed August 7, 2007). 
 
Duncan, Robert H. “The Chinese and the Economic Development of Northern Baja California.” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 4 (Nov., 1994): 615-647.  
http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed Aug. 7, 2007). 
 
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “Voluntary Associations in a Predominantly Male Immigrant Community: 
The Chinese on the Northern Mexican Frontier, 1880-1930.”  In Voluntary Organizations 
in the Chinese Diaspora, edited by Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Evelyn Hu-Dehart, 141-
168.  Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006. 
 
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn.  “On Coolies and Shopkeepers: The Chinese as Huagong (Laborers) and 
Huashang (Merchants) in Latin America/Caribbean.” In Displacements and Diasporas: 
Asians in the Americas, edited by Wanni W. Anderson and Robert G. Lee, 78-111.  New 
Brunswick, NJ, and London: Rutgers University Press, 2005.  
 
Izquierdo, José Jorge Gómez. El movimiento antichino en México (1871-1934). México, D.F.:  
Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1991. 
 
Jamal, Amina. “Gender, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in Pakistan: Willful Daughters or Free 
Citizens?” Signs 31, no. 2 (Winter 2006): 283-304.  
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/SIGNS/journal/issues/v31n2.  
(accessed Nov. 27, 2007). 
 
Jaques, Leo M.  “Have Quick More Money Than Mandarins: The Chinese in Sonora.”  The 
Journal of Arizona History 17, no 2 (1976): 201-218. 
 
Joseph, Gilbert M. and Daniel Nugent.  “Popular Culture and State Formation in Revolutionary 
Mexico.”  In Everyday Forms of State Formation: Revolution and the Negotiation of Rule 
in Modern Mexico, edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, 3-24.  Durham and 
London, Duke University Press, 1994.    
  
 
 
58
Lake, Marilyn.  “Australian Frontier Feminism and the Marauding White Man.”  In Gender and 
Imperialism, edited by Claire Midgley, 123-136.  Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1998. 
 
National Archives Record Group 59.  A National Archives Microfilm Publication.  The Ohio 
State University Libraries. 
 
Romero, Robert Chao.  “The Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement in 
Mexico, 1882-1940,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California Los Angeles, 2003). 
 
Schiavone Camacho, Julia Maria.  “Traversing Boundaries: Chinese, Mexicans, and Chinese 
Mexicans in the Formation of Gender, Race, and Nation in the Twentieth Century U.S.-
Mexican Borderlands,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas El Paso, 2006). 
 
Sommer, Doris.  “Introduction: Wiggle Room.”  In Cultural Agency in the Americas, edited by 
Doris Sommer, 1-28.  Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006. 
 
Ward, Margaret.  “National Liberation Movements and the Question of Women’s Liberation: the 
Irish Experience.” In Gender and Imperialism, edited by Claire Midgley, 104-122.  
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1998. 
 
Vázquez, Josefina Zoraida and Lorenzo Meyer. The United States and Mexico. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Yuval-Davis, Nira.  “Theorizing Gender and Nation.”  In Gender and Nation, 1-25.  Thousand 
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 1997. 
 
 
